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Bayesianism has been dubbed as the most adequate and successful the-
ory of scientifi c rationality. Its success mainly lies in its ability to com-
bine two mutually exclusive elements involved in the process of theory-
selection in science, viz.: the subjective and objective elements. My aim in 
this paper is to explain and evaluate Bayesianism’s account of scientifi c 
rationality by contrasting it with two other accounts.
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1. The Problem of Scientifi c Rationality
The problem of scientifi c rationality is one the most important prob-
lems in philosophy of science. Throughout its long and colorful history, 
the problem has seen many formulations. However, there seems to be 
an essential theme that remains the same in all those varying formula-
tions. This can be formulated as follows: “Does the choice of a particu-
lar scientifi c theory over another involve rationality?” Notice that the 
concept of rationality fi gures prominently here. It is, thus, important 
to show what it means.
When we talk about rationality in the problem of scientifi c rational-
ity we are talking about the rationality involved in choosing one theory 
over another; i.e. we are talking about the conditions that constitute 
the reasonableness of such a choice. Let me elaborate on this further. 
Suppose that we have two rival theories, X and Y, trying to describe the 
same phenomenon. X and Y are not reducible to one another, since the 
set of statements, which makes up X, could not be subsumed to Y, and 
vice-versa. Suppose further that the scientifi c community chooses X 
over Y. The issue here is whether those scientists really have good rea-
sons to choose X over Y, and if they have, what conditions then would 
constitute the choice’s reasonableness.
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On the one hand, some philosophers hold that a choice’s reason-
ableness is simply determined by a strict methodological process. They 
claim that there are procedures and criteria in determining whether 
a theory is better than another. Others claim, on the other hand, that 
the reasonability of a choice is more complex than that. They claim 
that scientifi c rationality can only be explained by looking at arbitrary 
elements present in the processes involved in scientifi c enterprise as 
a whole. The issue about scientifi c rationality, therefore, is concerned 
with explaining the conditions that constitute the rationality of the 
theory-selection process in science. Before discussing this further, 
there is a much pressing matter that I need to address fi rst.
Some philosophers have objected to the idea of characterizing the 
problem of scientifi c rationality only in terms of the rationality of the 
theory-selection process. They claim that this idea is founded on a 
faulty assumption. They contend that since the process of theory-selec-
tion is only one of the activities done in the sciences, it would not follow 
that if this were irrational, the whole scientifi c enterprise would then 
be irrational. For them, the whole debate about scientifi c rationality 
falsely assumes that the rationality of science as a whole is seen only 
in the theory-selection process.1
Like many other philosophers dealing with scientifi c rationality, I 
do not deny that the theory-selection process is just another activity 
done in the sciences. I need to emphasize, however, that the epitome 
of the scientifi c enterprise is seen in this process. The rationality of 
the whole enterprise is best seen in the manner by which the scien-
tifi c community decides what theories to accept or reject. If their choice 
were made unreasonably, it puts into question the entire scientifi c en-
terprise. On the other hand, if it was proven otherwise, then it reas-
sures us of the confi dence that we give to science. The reason why the 
problem of scientifi c rationality, as is characterized here, focuses on the 
debate concerning the rationality of the theory-selection process is not 
only because it is the epitome of the scientifi c enterprise, but also be-
cause it assures us of the confi dence that we give to science as a whole.
2. Two Alternative Solutions
There are two very infl uential solutions to the problem of scientifi c ra-
tionality. There are those who claim that the choice of a scientifi c theory 
is determined by strictly following a method. For others, such a choice 
is ultimately determined by reasons external to science itself—be it per-
sonal, social, or political. Adherents of the former solution are infl uenced 
by logical empiricism’s rational reconstruction program; adherents of 
the latter are infl uenced by Kuhn’s historiographical theory of science.
1 For example, Siegel (1985) has argued that the issue concerning the rationality 
of the process of theory-selection presupposes an answer to the question, “In what 
constitutes rationality in science?” He claims that this question is prior to the 
question formulated in this paper. I shall argue against this claim.
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For a long time, the rational reconstruction program has been the 
standard conception of scientifi c rationality. Adherents of this program 
not only include the logical empiricists, like Schlick and Carnap, but 
also the Popperians—supporters of Popper—and the later neo-pragma-
tists, like Quine and van Fraasen. By considering the following theses, 
we could have an idea of the rational reconstructionist’s solution to the 
problem of scientifi c rationality:2
(1) the thesis of the unifi ed method of science
(2) the thesis of formalizability of this method
(3) the demarcation thesis; and,
(4) the thesis of scientifi c rationality.
The fi rst thesis tells us that by looking at the history of science, one 
would fi nd some semblance of a unifi ed scientifi c method. The second 
states that it is possible to formalize or systematize this method, and it 
is the philosopher’s task to do so. Through the second thesis, the third 
thesis states that this formalized scientifi c method differentiates sci-
ence from the non-sciences and the pseudo-sciences. Still via the second 
thesis, the fourth thesis tells us that such a method could show how sci-
ence really works. That is, how scientifi c theories are made, how they 
are accepted, and whatnot.
From the four theses, we could already have an idea how the ratio-
nal reconstructionist would answer the problem of scientifi c rational-
ity. The solution is roughly this. Given two opposing theories, X and Y, 
scientists would choose X over Y if and only if (iff) using the formalized 
scientifi c method, X is shown to be better than Y. The idea is that this 
formalized scientifi c method would give adequate reasons to prefer one 
theory over the other. The process of theory-selection, therefore, would 
only be a matter of following the rules set by this method. But what is 
this method?
There are two competing “methods” available for the rational recon-
structionists: the method of confi rmation and the method of falsifi ca-
tion.3 The method of confi rmation works as follows. Scientifi c inquiry 
usually starts with a theory. If predictions or descriptions made using 
this theory were shown to be true by some (either observational or ex-
perimental) evidence, then such a theory would thus be confi rmed, or 
at least shown to be empirically adequate. In light of the problem of 
scientifi c rationality, this method works as follows. Given two opposing 
theories, X and Y, if the gathered evidence shows that X’s descriptions 
are true, and shows Y’s to be false, it would then warrant the choice 
of X over Y. Because of this simple formula for theory-selection, many 
2 I am following the discussion of these four theses in (Jiang 1985).
3 It should be noted, however, that there is a deep tension between these 
“methods” of science. Proponents of the method of confi rmation, like Hempel, 
claim that this method is a more powerful method than the method of falsifi cation. 
Proponents of the other camp, like Popper, make the same claim in favor of their 
preferred “method”.
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rational reconstructionists were led to believe that the method of con-
fi rmation is the best method for science. Others, like Popper, were not 
quite impressed by this.
Popper has showed that if the method of confi rmation were the real 
method of science, then theories like astrology and alchemy would have 
to be accepted as scientifi c theories, since this method could easily be 
applied to them. Of course, rational reconstructionists would repudiate 
this idea because, for them, these “sciences” are not really scientifi c. 
Since the method of confi rmation would consider such theories as sci-
entifi c, Popper claims that it is the wrong method of science. What he 
proposes as an alternative is the method of falsifi cation.
The method of falsifi cation assumes that theories can never really 
be confi rmed; rather, they can only be temporarily corroborated by cer-
tain evidence. Like the method of confi rmation, the method of falsifi ca-
tion sees that scientifi c inquiry begins with a theory. However, unlike 
the former, the latter obliges scientists to look for evidence that could 
show that their theory is false—since the true mark of a scientifi c theo-
ry is its falsifi ability (possibility to be false). If the lot of evidence were 
to show that the theory is false, then it would have to be rejected. If 
otherwise, then it is said to be corroborated by such evidence. Nothing 
is fi nal here. Some accepted theory might eventually be rejected—due 
perhaps to some new evidence against it. But this should not cause 
dismay, for this process is the mark of “scientifi c progress.” In light of 
the problem of scientifi c rationality, the method of falsifi cation works 
as follows. Given two opposing theories, X and Y, X is chosen over Y iff 
X and Y are falsifi able and X is corroborated by certain evidence, while 
Y is not. If X is later shown to be false by some new evidence, and an-
other theory, Z, which is falsifi able but is now corroborated by that new 
evidence, Z should be chosen over X.
For rational reconstructionists, therefore, scientifi c rationality is 
determined solely by the method of science. On the basis of evidence, 
theories are accepted or rejected. The manner by which theories are 
accepted or rejected depends either on how evidence corroborates or 
confi rms them. There are three important elements in this account of 
scientifi c rationality. First, theories should be about something empiri-
cally testable. Second, evidence that confi rms or corroborates should 
be external to the theory. Third, confi rmation (or corroboration) de-
termines the acceptance or rejection of a theory. Only by following the 
method of science could we show how scientifi c rationality is possible. 
Friends of the rational reconstruction program have thus shown that 
there can only be an objective way of answering the problem of scien-
tifi c rationality.
Kuhn, a leading proponent of the historiographical theory of sci-
ence, has raised crucial objections against the rational reconstruction 
program’s solution to the problem of scientifi c rationality. First, he sees 
that the picture of the history of science proposed by the rational re-
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constructionist is normative rather than descriptive. He argues that 
if we were to look at the actual history of science, we would not see 
a unifi ed method that governs scientifi c growth; what we would see, 
rather, are “non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older 
paradigm is replaced…by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn 1996, 92). 
Since the fi rst thesis espoused by rational reconstructionists tells us 
that a unifi ed method of science can be seen in the history of science, 
and if Kuhn’s observations are correct, then this rational reconstruc-
tionist thesis would be false. What then is the intellectual force of such 
a thesis? For Kuhn, since this thesis is false, it would mean that the 
rational reconstructionist’s insistence for a method of science would 
merely be an imposition of a dogma. If this were the case, it would then 
follow that their clamor for a method of science would be circular, thus 
making the “method” of science questionable.
Second, Kuhn points out that the rational reconstructionist’s depic-
tion of scientifi c rationality is limited. That is, their thesis of scientifi c 
rationality does not provide a complete description of the scientifi c pro-
cess. For rational reconstructionists, the process of choosing a theory 
over another would simply be a matter of strictly following the method 
of science. However, Kuhn points out that this view only applies to a 
specifi c period in the history of science, which he calls “normal science”, 
and not to whole history of science. Kuhn defi nes “normal science” as 
“research fi rmly based upon one or more past scientifi c achievements, 
achievements that some particular scientifi c community acknowledges 
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (1996: 10). 
Since normal science is based on the scientifi c community’s acknowledg-
ment of these past achievements, a particular way of doing science is 
thus born. This way of doing science is what Kuhn calls a “paradigm”.
For Kuhn, a paradigm functions like the rational reconstructionist’s 
view of the method of science. It determines what evidence would be 
acceptable in confi rming a theory, or what research topic should be un-
dertaken in perfecting a theory. This determination, however, is only 
made within this dominant paradigm. Kuhn further points out that in 
the actual history of science there were episodes where this paradigm 
breaks down due to some anomalies that could not be accounted by the 
dominant paradigm. The break down of a paradigm is what he calls, 
“crisis science”. In crisis science, the scientifi c community suffers a ter-
rible fate because the dominant paradigm is put into question. Without 
this paradigm, normal science would cease its activities. Kuhn argues 
that although some scientists would try to save the old paradigm, in 
the time of crisis many would offer new paradigms to account for the 
anomalies that the old paradigm could not. In this period, the whole 
scientifi c enterprise would have many different paradigms. But crisis 
science would eventually end. Its end is marked by the “emergence of 
a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its ac-
ceptance.” (Kuhn 1996: 84). The problem, then, is to determine the con-
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ditions and processes involved in choosing one paradigm over another.
To paraphrase Kuhn, it is impossible to use the rational reconstruc-
tionist’s idea of the method of science as a standard of rationality of 
choosing one paradigm over another “for these (methods) depend in 
part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue.” (1996: 
94). Kuhn further claims that to resort to a “method” in choosing be-
tween paradigms is circular since “[e]ach group uses its own paradigm 
to argue in that paradigm’s defense” (1996: 94). Thus, Kuhn shows that 
the rational reconstructionist’s main theses are problematic. And since 
they are problematic, their solution to the problem of scientifi c ratio-
nality would be problematic as well.
Kuhn’s alternative account of scientifi c rationality is somewhat 
controversial. He sees scientifi c rationality not as a matter of simple 
rule-governed processes, but a more complex one.4 For Kuhn, science 
is a human endeavor. As such, there are elements in it that color the 
way science is conducted. Since science is a human endeavor, it follows 
that scientifi c rationality is also marked by these humanistic elements. 
For Kuhn, “[a]n apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal 
and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs 
espoused by a given scientifi c community in a given time” (1996: 4). 
The combination of this arbitrary element and the personal niceties 
of scientists make the problem of scientifi c rationality a human issue. 
In this picture, scientifi c rationality is an ongoing process that starts 
from the formative years of the members of a scientifi c community, up 
to their activities in specifi c fi elds, then to their decision to accept or 
reject theories, and then to the process of relearning or unlearning old 
ways of thinking. Furthermore, this process informs the way that a sci-
entist chooses anything. A scientist’s background would infl uence his 
preferred area of research. A group of scientists’ shared commitments 
would determine their choice of accepting the results of an experiment.
In general, for Kuhnian historiographers of science, scientifi c ra-
tionality—and the rationality of choosing one theory over another—
depends on arbitrary elements external to the logic and method of 
science, or even to the facts observed. Thus, these apparent arbitrary 
elements also determine the theory-selection process. Such a process is 
founded upon certain value-laden reasons and commitments shared by 
the members of a scientifi c community. These reasons are not derived 
from any method of science, but are more political or social in nature. 
To put it roughly, the Kuhnian idea of scientifi c rationality with regard 
to theory-selection is this. Given two opposing theories, X and Y, X is 
chosen over Y iff a consensus to choose X over Y is reached by the mem-
bers of the scientifi c community.
This does not mean that a theory is selected by mere majority vote 
4 In what will come next, I have refrained from articulating certain Kuhnian 
themes, like revolutionary science, changes of worldview, and incommensurability 
of theories as these are not deemed necessary to articulate the historiographical 
theory’s main thesis.
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or by a shared whim. Rather, members of the scientifi c community 
eventually arrive at a choice because of the values and commitments 
they share, like valuing the consistency and plausibility of the theory, 
or the commitment to scientifi c development, etc. It is not the case, 
however, that the sharing of values and commitments means that the 
assignment of importance of values or commitments is the same for 
each member of the community. This is not possible because each in-
dividual, informed by their personal backgrounds, would assign levels 
of value differently. Only by having these different subjective values 
meet could a consensus be produced. Kuhn’s historiographical view of 
science gives much importance to these subjective values because these 
have “an important effect on scientifi c development” (ibid). But this 
emphasis on subjective values is not without problems.
Many philosophers have argued that Kuhn’s emphasis on subjec-
tive values makes the whole theory-selection process a highly subjec-
tive affair. Kuhn does not deny this; in fact he embraces it. Subjectiv-
ity drives science to progress. Without it, science will be impossible. 
On the other hand, others have argued that if Kuhn’s view is correct, 
then it would show that whole scientifi c enterprise would be irrational. 
Kuhn counters that this objection is only tenable if rationality means 
strictly following a rule or method; but as we have seen, he denies that 
there is such a method.
One very important objection against Kuhn’s historiographical view 
is the fact that, contrary to Kuhn’s point, the process of theory-selec-
tion involves evidence. Kuhn’s account focuses too much attention on 
the historical aspects of science that the question of evidence has been 
overlooked. Why is it that although there are subjective elements that 
strongly infl uence a scientist’s acceptance of a theory, the very same 
scientist would, more often than not, accept a theory on the basis of 
compelling evidence for it, even if such evidence is contrary to his per-
sonal beliefs? This is a feature of scientifi c rationality that Kuhn’s view 
fails to give a judicious account.
3. Bayesianism
The main project of the Bayesian approach to scientifi c rationality is 
to combine the rational reconstructionist’s insistence for an objective 
method of determining a choice’s reasonableness with Kuhn’s empha-
sis on the importance of subjective arbitrary elements that infl uence 
the members of the scientifi c community. There are three important 
elements here that need to be considered:
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(1) a subjective interpretation of probability statements5;
(2) the Dutch book argument; and,
(3) Bayesian thesis of rationality.6
With these three elements, Bayesianism does not only give an ade-
quate theory of scientifi c rationality, but also restored the importance 
of evidence and confi rmation in the theory-selection process.
Bayesianism begins with a subjective interpretation of probability. 
On this view, probability statements are statements about personal de-
grees of beliefs.7 These degrees of beliefs are quantifi able according to 
a 0 to 1 scale, 0 being the lowest value and 1 being the highest. The as-
signment of these values is a highly personal, thus subjective, affair. A 
person can freely assign a value of .70 to his belief that he will win the 
lottery, regardless of whether he has strong grounds for it. The only re-
striction that Bayesianism imposes on the assignment of values is the 
coherence of this assignment with other beliefs. Since the assignment 
of values is too subjective, then there would be a problem of determin-
ing coherence, since we can have a coherent set of irrational beliefs. To 
answer this problem, Bayesianism has the Dutch book argument.
The Dutch book argument is a pragmatic test for the coherence of 
degrees of beliefs. In its simplest formulation, it states that if a person 
should be willing to act in accordance to his beliefs. However, if the re-
sult of his action would make him suffer more losses than receive more 
gains, then his beliefs are incoherent, and he is acting irrationally; oth-
erwise they are coherent, and he is acting rationally. For Bayesians, 
the coherence of beliefs is a matter of a betting game.
5 There are three dominant interpretations of probability statements: a priori 
(classical) interpretation, relative frequency interpretation, and the subjectivist 
interpretation. The classical interpretation, developed by the “fathers” of probability 
theory, Fermat and Pascal, tells us that probability statements are statements about 
the chances of some favorable outcome happening over the total number of possible 
outcomes. Thus, the statement, “There’s a 25% chance that I’ll get a clubs from a 
standard deck of cards” means that of the fi fty-two cards, there are thirteen chances 
of having a favorable outcome. On the other hand, the relative frequency theory, 
developed by Keynes, claims that probability statements are statements about the 
number of instances that a favorable outcome happens over an observed period of 
time. Thus, the statement, “There’s a 30% chance that I’ll get six in a single roll of 
a loaded die” means that out ten times that I rolled that die, three turned up six. 
The subjectivist interpretation, developed by Ramsey, sees probability statements 
as statements about a person’s partial beliefs. Thus, the statement, “There’s a 
20% chance that I’ll get the job” means that the person who uttered the statement 
sees that there’s a low chance for him to get the job. For further discussions on the 
interpretations of probability, see (Hajek 2012).
6 Bayesianism is considered as a general theory of rationality, see (Joyce 2004). 
But although this is the case, it does not prohibit extending its use to account for 
scientifi c rationality.
7 Ramsey is acknowledged as the fi rst to discuss the philosophical underpinnings 
of a subjective interpretation of probability statements, see the collection of his 
works in (Ramsey 1996).
 J. J. Joaquin, Bayesianism and the Idea of Scientifi c Rationality 41
Suppose that person, A, assigns .51 to belief, B, and assigns the 
same value to a contrary belief, not-B. Suppose further that someone 
offered him a wager to the effect that A bets $6 on B and another $6 
on not-B. If B obtains, A will win $10; if not-B obtains, he’ll also re-
ceive $10. Suppose that either B or not-B will obtain, but not both. If A 
decides to bet on both B and not-B, then we will know that he has an 
incoherent set of beliefs, since he is willing to lose $12 only to gain $10.
The Dutch book argument shows that the coherence of a set of be-
liefs, hence also the rationality of the person having those beliefs, can 
be determined if that person is not willing to lose more than he could 
gain. If the person decides to act according to his incoherent beliefs, 
then he is acting irrationally. Notice here, that the argument works 
on two assumptions. First, rationality of choices involves coherence of 
beliefs, which in turn presupposes the notion of utility expectations; 
second, there are external elements that determine the coherence of 
beliefs. These two aspects are very important in Bayesianism’s account 
of scientifi c rationality.
External elements, like observational or experimental evidence, are 
important in determining rationality of choices. Although, Bayesians 
are willing to grant that the assignment of values is subjective, they 
also believe that it is important to look at external objective factors that 
determine a choice’s rationality. Objectivity is founded on a formalized 
notion of confi rmation. It is formulated as follows. A certain evidence, 
E, confi rms a person’s subjective assignment of degrees of belief, P(B), 
just in case E raises P(B). That is, P(B/E) > P(B). Otherwise it is dis-
confi rmed. Confi rmation happens on the level of the subject involved. 
Via a subjectivist interpretation of probability, a person assigns a value 
to his belief. If some evidence confi rms this belief, then this evidence 
raises his confi dence to his belief. There is an implicit appeal to condi-
tional probabilities here. That is, if E confi rms P(B), then E raises P(B).
The formalized idea of confi rmation has the Bayesian theory of ra-
tionality as a necessary consequence. This is formulated as follows: 
P(T/E) = P(E/T) x P(T)/P(E).8 What this formula means is simply that a 
theory is more confi rmed by unexpected evidence than expected ones. 
8 Where P(T/E) means that the degree of belief to a theory given the evidence; 
P(E/T) expresses a measure that that the evidence is unsuprising given the theory; 
P(T) means the degree of belief to a theory prior the evidence; and P(E) means 
the prior probability of evidence. Because of limited space, I could not unpack the 
niceties of this formula. However, I’ll try to discuss the two principles involved 
here: (1) the prediction (expectation) principle; and (2) the surprise principle. The 
prediction principle states that if a person assigns a high value to the belief that 
some evidence, E, would occur because of a theory, T, then E strongly confi rms T 
if E thus arise. The surprise principle, on the other hand, states that if a person is 
expecting two evidences: E and E* from T, if E is more surprising than E*, but would 
not be surprising if T were true, then E strongly confi rms T than E* does. These two 
principles show that unexpected evidence that a theory predicts strongly confi rms 
that theory than expected evidence could. For further details of the formulation, see 
(Joyce 2004).
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Thus, if some evidence strongly confi rms a theory, I should then assign 
a higher value to my theory given the evidence.9 The importance of this 
result can be seen more clearly if we apply it in relation to the problem 
of scientifi c rationality.
The Bayesian account of scientifi c rationality—especially of the ra-
tionality of choice—amounts to the following. If two theories, X and Y, 
predict that some event, E, is expected to happen, and E does happen, 
then X and Y are confi rmed by E. Of course confi rmation here still 
relates to the raising of subjective degrees of beliefs. But if X predicts 
a further unexpected event F, which Y did not predict, and F does hap-
pen, given this unexpected evidence, one should raise the degree of be-
lief to X than Y given F. As the Bayesian theory of rationality suggests, 
since some evidence raises our confi dence to X than Y, then it should 
follow that we need to assign a higher value to X than Y. That is, X 
would be a reasonable choice than Y. Furthermore, given the Dutch 
book argument, if a person chooses Y over X given F, that person then 
is acting irrationally.
Bayesianism accounts for scientifi c rationality by considering two 
mutually exclusive elements in the theory-selection process: the subjec-
tive assignment of values to one’s beliefs, and the objective confi rming 
evidence of a theory. Bayesianism suggests that in choosing between 
two or more theories, it is always reasonable to choose the one which is 
confi rmed by evidence. To choose otherwise is to succumb to the Dutch 
book argument.
4. Conclusion
I have discussed some of the intricacies of the philosophical debate 
about scientifi c rationality. I have shown that problem of scientifi c ra-
tionality is concerned with explaining the constitution of the rational-
ity of choice in the sciences. Many philosophers have offered their solu-
tions to it by maintaining either an extreme version of objectivism or 
subjectivism. The rational reconstructionists have espoused the former 
solution; while Kuhnians the latter. The rational reconstructionist’s 
solution succumbs to Kuhn’s historical critique. Kuhn’s view, however, 
failed to recognize the importance of evidence in the theory-selection 
process. I have argued that Bayesianism offers a middle ground that 
reconciles both extreme positions. Armed with the subjective interpre-
tation of probability, which highlights personal (subjective) assignment 
of values to beliefs, and the Dutch book argument, which is an objective 
test of the coherence of these assignments, Bayesians approached the 
problem of scientifi c rationality with a renewed interest on how evi-
dence confi rms a theory. As such, Bayesianism showed that although 
our beliefs are really subjective, we still have to choose the best theory 
9 Bayesianism is also characterized as a normative theory of rationality, see 
(Joyce 2004).
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among other competing theories. And in having the notion of a “best” 
choice, we are already implying that we can have rational grounds for 
choosing one over the other. However, the rationality of this choice is 
not determined solely by a strict application of method or by mere per-
sonal arbitrary elements that surround our choices. The rationality of 
our choice of a theory is founded on evidence confi rming that theory.
My main aim in this paper is to show that Bayesianism is indeed 
an adequate theory of scientifi c rationality. What I have discussed here 
are brief descriptions of the rational reconstruction program, Kuhn’s 
historiographical view, and Bayesianism. Comparing the three, I have 
shown that Bayesianism reconciled the best aspects of the two other 
theories. As such, I can say that the Bayesian approach is indeed an 
adequate account of scientifi c rationality.
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